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Eliminating Circuit-Split Disparities in Federal
Sentencing Under the Post-Booker Guidelines
ELLIOT EDWARDS*
Congress has lately been plagued by political polarization and gridlock.1 The 112th
and 113th Congresses, sitting from 2011 to 2013, have been the least productive in
modern times.2 By contrast, the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which is empowered
to set the nation’s sentencing policy, has been working diligently despite its
sometimes politically sensitive task. In 2014, the Commission reduced sentences for
nonviolent drug offenders and made that reduction retroactive; this change led to the
release of over six thousand federal inmates in November 2015. 3 Such a politically
dangerous move4 could be unthinkable to the modern Congress.
The 2014 Term of the U.S. Supreme Court was an important one both for statutory
interpretation and for federal sentencing law, which are the domains of Congress and
the Commission, respectively. The Court decided two important cases in June 2015:
King v. Burwell,5 which upheld a key provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; and Johnson v. United States,6 which struck down as unconstitutionally vague a provision in the Armed Career Criminal Act. The former case, which
will be discussed in more detail,7 denotes a significant shift in the established practices of statutory interpretation. 8 And the Court’s decision in Johnson has already

* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.M., 2014, Indiana
University Jacobs School of Music. My deepest thanks to Professor Jessica Eaglin for
introducing me to federal sentencing law and for all her support; to Ashley Eklund and Megan
Binder for writing the Sherman Minton Moot Court Competition problem that inspired this
Note; to Annie Xie, Emily Kile, and the rest of the Indiana Law Journal staff for working
tirelessly to make this issue a reality; and to Mercedes Lysaker for her love, her patience, and
her unending support. All mistakes are my own.
1. See SARAH BINDER, BROOKINGS INST., POLARIZED WE GOVERN? (2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/05/27-polarized-we-govern-binder
/brookingscepm_polarized_figreplacedtextrevtablerev.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2HM-37DU].
2. Philip Bump, The 114th Congress Had a Pretty Productive Year (by Recent
Standards, At Least), WASH. POST: THE FIX (Dec. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/24/the-114th-congress-had-a-pretty-productive-year-by-recent-standards
-at-least/ [https://perma.cc/7WHY-FLZ9]; see also Drew Desilver, In Late Spurt of Activity,
Congress Avoids ‘Least Productive’ Title, PEW RESEARCH CENTER: FACT TANK (Dec. 29,
2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/29/in-late-spurt-of-activity-congress
-avoids-least-productive-title/ [https://perma.cc/E8Z4-D7ZT] (discussing the 114th Congress).
3. Erik Eckholm, Thousands Start Life Anew with Early Prison Releases, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/us/with-early-release-thousands-of-inmates
-are-adjusting-to-freedom.html [https://perma.cc/5JYW-BH7U].
4. See Sarah Wheaton, Has Obama Set Loose a New Willie Horton?, POLITICO (Nov. 2,
2015, 5:41 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/11/obama-prisoner-release-215431
[https://perma.cc/S6QQ-R2GC].
5. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
6. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s
Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62 (2015).

818

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 92:817

prompted the Sentencing Commission, the body that sets federal sentencing policy,
to revise the Sentencing Guidelines that correspond to the statute the Court
invalidated.9
The “career-offender” guideline, which the Commission is currently revising, has
been a notoriously difficult provision to interpret. 10 But the circuits have split over
provisions in the Guidelines that are much less ambiguous.11 Because the Guidelines
are supposed to promote uniformity of sentencing throughout the federal courts, the
disparities caused by these inconsistent interpretations, along with the potential disparities allowed by the appellate courts’ broad authority to interpret the Guidelines,
are unwarranted and must be addressed. As this Note will show, the political independence and procedural fluency of the Commission suggest a simple solution.
This Note will explore the rarely discussed consequences that result when courts
of appeals freely interpret the Sentencing Guidelines. This Note will not address appellate review of sentences in general,12 nor will it discuss disparities caused by trial
courts.13 Instead, the discussion below will address a very specific situation, namely
when a court of appeals vacates a sentence because, in its estimation, the trial court
misapplied the Guidelines. Part I will relate the history of the recent sentencing reform movement in America, noting particularly which bodies have the authority to
decide sentencing policy. Part II will then analyze the interpretive power of the courts
of appeals—the sole source of their ability to affect sentencing outcomes—and
demonstrate the potential sentencing disparities that may result. Part III will contrast
the Sentencing Commission with Congress, demonstrating some key procedural differences between the bodies. Finally, Part IV will propose that courts adopt a strictly
textualist interpretation of the Guidelines, justified by the procedural integrity of the
Sentencing Commission, that would minimize intercircuit sentencing disparities and
return discretion to its rightful possessors.
I. SEATS OF SENTENCING DISCRETION
The history of sentencing reform in America has been one of shifting discretion.14
Before the Sentencing Reform Act was passed in 1984, the dominant purpose of

9. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 81 Fed. Reg. 4741 (notice of submission of amendment given Jan. 27, 2016); Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 80
Fed. Reg. 49,314 (notice of proposed amendment given Aug. 17, 2015); U.S. Sentencing
Commission Set To Act on Crimes of Violence, FAMS. AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS (Jan.
5, 2016), http://famm.org/u-s-sentencing-commission-set-to-act-on-crimes-of-violence/ [https://
perma.cc/3V4D-4NXP].
10. See M. Jackson Jones, Ten out of Eleven Federal Circuits Agree: No One Knows
Whether Section 4B1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Covers Burglary of Commercial Structures, 8 APPALACHIAN J.L. 59, 64–66 (2008).
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See, e.g., Note, More Than a Formality: The Case for Meaningful Substantive
Reasonableness Review, 127 HARV. L. REV. 951 (2014).
13. See, e.g., Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First
Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2010).
14. In this Note, the phrase “sentencing discretion” refers to an entity’s legal authority to
influence criminal sentences.
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sentencing was rehabilitation—crime was treated as a disease that could be cured
through prison time. 15 This was the age of “indeterminate” sentencing; trial judges
had untrammeled authority to impose whatever sentence they saw fit, limited only
by wide statutory margins.16 Sentencing during this period was not subject to appellate review.17 And, because of the parole system, few offenders served their full
sentences.18
Offenders had few constitutional protections against judicial sentencing decisions
during this period.19 In Williams v. New York, a 1949 U.S. Supreme Court case, the
defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, and the jury recommended life imprisonment.20 The judge, considering hearsay evidence of thirty burglaries the defendant had apparently committed as well as his “morbid sexuality,” rejected the
jury’s recommendation and sentenced Williams to death.21 On appeal, Williams challenged the sentence on due-process grounds; he had received a death sentence based
on inadmissible evidence and with no recognizable standard of proof. 22 The Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court’s sentence and demonstrated that judges need to use all
available information about an offender to advance the then-modern goals of criminal punishment: “[r]eformation and rehabilitation of offenders.” 23 Because out-ofcourt information is “[h]ighly relevant” to proper sentencing, the Court reasoned, the
Due Process Clause should not be allowed to interfere with penological advances. 24
By the 1970s, the indeterminate model had fallen under harsh attack from all
sides.25 Scholars and politicians began to argue that criminal “treatment” methods
were ineffective at preventing recidivism or reforming inmates,26 and the unlimited
discretion enjoyed by trial judges seemed to invite totally arbitrary sentences 27
motivated in some cases by racial bias. 28 These problems sparked an era of

15. Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much
Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 695 (2010). Much of this discussion
of sentencing history is drawn from Judge Gertner’s article.
16. Id. at 696.
17. Id. at 695–96; see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) (“Before the
Guidelines system, a federal criminal sentence was, for all practical purposes, not reviewable
on appeal.”).
18. Gertner, supra note 15, at 696. An average federal inmate was paroled after serving
only fifty-eight percent of her sentence. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF
GUIDELINES SENTENCING 45 (2004).
19. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251–52 (1949).
20. Id. at 242.
21. Id. at 244.
22. Id. at 245–46.
23. Id. at 248.
24. Id. at 247, 251.
25. See Gertner, supra note 15, at 698.
26. See id. For an influential review of studies about criminal rehabilitation, see Robert
Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, PUB. INT., Spring
1974, at 22.
27. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 49
(1973) (criticizing judges’ “unbridled power . . . to be arbitrary and discriminatory”).
28. See Joseph C. Howard, Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 59 JUDICATURE 121 (1975)
(providing a contemporary account of the racial problems that prompted sentencing reform).
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comprehensive sentencing reform that continues to this day.29 The two subparts that
follow will discuss the two landmark events in recent legal history that shifted the
seat of federal sentencing discretion: Part I.A will describe the creation of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, and Part I.B will discuss a series of Supreme Court
decisions that returned some discretion to trial judges.
A. The Sentencing Commission
After nearly a decade of trying, 30 Congress passed a comprehensive sentencing
reform bill on October 12, 1984.31 The Sentencing Reform Act of 198432 made several key reforms. First, retribution replaced rehabilitation as the primary purpose of
sentencing.33 Thus, the Act abolished federal parole boards that had previously released “reformed” inmates.34 This change also meant that an offender would know
at sentencing exactly how long her sentence would be. 35 The second and more controversial effect of the Act was to establish the U.S. Sentencing Commission and to
direct the Commission to write the Sentencing Guidelines. 36 This Commission was
to comprise several sentencing experts37 who would be able to create fair sentencing
standards without yielding to political pressures. 38
After three years of heated debate, the Commission published the first U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual on November 1, 1987.39 This sparked a period of constitutional attacks on the Guidelines and utter confusion over how they should be
implemented.40 The Supreme Court declared the Guidelines constitutional in
Mistretta v. United States, which quieted the litigation.41 Once the constitutional

29. A bipartisan sentencing reform bill was introduced in the Senate on October 1, 2015.
Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, S. 2123, 114th Cong. (as introduced in
Senate, Oct. 1, 2015); Senators Announce Bipartisan Sentencing Reform and Corrections
Act, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY (Oct. 1, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www
.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/senators-announce-bipartisan-sentencing-reform-and-corrections
-act [https://perma.cc/R2SB-T683].
30. For a detailed account of the legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act and the
creation of the Guidelines, see Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform:
The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993).
31. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 18, at 5.
32. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C. (2012)).
33. Gertner, supra note 15, at 698.
34. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 18, at 11–12.
35. This concept is often called “truth in sentencing.” Id.
36. Gertner, supra note 15, at 698–99.
37. Id. at 700.
38. See id. at 698.
39. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
40. Carol P. Getty, Twenty Years of Federal Criminal Sentencing, 7 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L
STUD. 117, 119 (2007).
41. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). Mistretta was an important case that generated quite a few case
notes by law students; for a sample, see Julia L. Black, Note, The Constitutionality of Federal
Sentences Imposed Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 After Mistretta v. United States,
75 IOWA L. REV. 767 (1990); Arthur C. Leahy, Note, Mistretta v. United States: Mistreating

2017]

ELI MI NA TI NG CI R CUI T - S PLI T D IS PARI TIES

821

challenges were resolved, the Guidelines went into mandatory effect throughout the
U.S. federal district courts.42
The Guidelines are essentially a mathematical formula that courts were required
to use to calculate sentences. 43 Today, sentencing is a three-step process: First, the
judge looks up the “base offense level” for the offender’s crime of conviction. 44 Then
she considers the offender’s “actual conduct”—what the offender really did—and
adds enhancements and reductions to the offense level accordingly. 45 She takes the
final offense level along with a separately calculated “criminal history category” and,
finally, finds the offender’s sentencing range on the Guidelines Manual’s chart. 46
Under the original structure of the Guidelines, judges had the authority to “depart”
from the calculated Guidelines range 47 if a particular offender presented extraordinary mitigating or aggravating factors at sentencing. 48 The Sentencing Commission
describes these “atypical” cases that warrant departure as outside the “heartland” of
circumstances the Guidelines are supposed to cover.49 The facts of Koon v. United
States, in which the Court set abuse of discretion as the standard of appellate review
for departures,50 provide a good example of such a departure. Stacey Koon and
Laurence Powell, two Los Angeles police officers, were convicted in federal court
of violating Rodney King’s constitutional rights, and the judge sentenced each defendant to thirty months in prison.51 This was a significant downward departure from
the properly calculated Guidelines range, which was seventy to eighty-seven
months.52 The trial judge justified this departure based on such factors as the victim’s
conduct and the likelihood that Koon and Powell would be abused in prison.53

the Separation of Powers Doctrine?, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 209 (1990); Laura Leigh Taylor
& J. Richard Neville, Note, Mistretta v. United States: Upholding the Constitutionality of the
Sentencing Guidelines, 40 MERCER L. REV. 1429 (1989).
42. Taylor & Neville, supra note 41, at 1430.
43. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2015) (instructions for calculating the Guidelines).
44. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(2).
45. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(3)–(5). The “real offense” standard was intended in part to reduce the
sentencing discretion of prosecutors, who could otherwise control an offender’s sentence by
deciding to charge one crime but not another. Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Revisited, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 180, 182 (1999). But see Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, Guidelines as Guidelines: Lessons from the History of Sentencing Reform, 2 CHARLOTTE L. REV.
101, 127 n.159 (2010) (“[T]he pre-Booker guidelines may have increased prosecutorial discretion by permitting prosecutors to charge and prove a minor offense and then punish the
defendant for conduct not proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
46. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(6), (7) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2015).
47. Gertner, supra note 15, at 699.
48. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92–93 (1996).
49. Id. at 94.
50. Id. at 91.
51. Id. at 88–90; Seth Mydans, Sympathetic Judges Gives Officers 2 1/2 Years in Rodney
King Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1993, at A1.
52. Koon, 518 U.S. at 89.
53. Id.
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In 2003, Congress limited even this amount of discretion. The PROTECT Act
abrogated the Court’s decision in Koon by allowing courts of appeals to review departures de novo.54 In 2005, when the Supreme Court ruled the Guidelines advisory,
it in turn struck down that provision of the PROTECT Act, a provision that would
only work if the Guidelines were mandatory.55
From their creation in 1987 until 2005, the Guidelines were mandatory, and sentencing discretion was concentrated in the Sentencing Commission. Congress managed its goal of reducing the extreme freedom possessed by judges in the indeterminate-sentencing era. But judges and scholars criticized the Guidelines system for
being too harsh and too restrictive of the trial judges who are the most closely involved with real-life sentencing.56 As the new millennium began, the Supreme Court
reclaimed some discretion for the trial judge.
B. The Effects of Booker
The end of the age of mandatory Guidelines began in 2000, when the Supreme
Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey.57 The Court held that, under the Sixth
Amendment, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to
a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”58 As the Court made clear four years
later in Blakely v. Washington, this statutory maximum is the maximum penalty the
judge could impose without finding additional facts not included in the jury’s verdict.59 In Blakely, the defendant was sentenced under the state of Washington’s determinate sentencing scheme, and the standard range for his crime of conviction,
kidnapping with a firearm, was forty-nine to fifty-three months.60 The trial judge,
however, found that Blakely had acted with “deliberate cruelty” and sentenced him
to ninety months in prison—a thirty-seven-month upward departure—based on evidence not proved to the jury.61 The Court held that this violated Apprendi: because
the judge could not have imposed a sentence longer than fifty-three months without
additional facts, those facts had to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 62
Blakely set the stage for the demise of the mandatory Guidelines.63 Seven months
later, the Supreme Court found that the Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional

54. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(d)(2), 117 Stat. 650, 670, invalidated
by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
55. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259; see infra text accompanying note 73.
56. See Getty, supra note 40, at 119.
57. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
58. Id. at 490.
59. 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004).
60. Id. at 299.
61. Id. at 300.
62. Id. at 303–05.
63. See Rose Duffy, Comment, The Return of Judicial Discretion, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 223,
231 (2008); see also Blakely, 542 U.S. at 326 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Over 20 years of
sentencing reform are all but lost, and tens of thousands of criminal judgments are in
jeopardy.”).
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if mandatory in United States v. Booker.64 Freddie Booker was convicted of possessing with intent to distribute at least fifty grams of crack cocaine; the prosecutor
had shown the jury evidence that Booker had possessed 92.5 grams. 65 Under the
Guidelines, the maximum period of incarceration Booker could have been sentenced
to for that quantity was 262 months—twenty-one years, ten months.66 At sentencing,
however, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker had actually possessed an additional 566 grams and that he was guilty of obstructing justice;
in light of these findings, the judge calculated Booker’s Guidelines range at thirty
years to life in prison.67 Booker challenged his sentence under Blakely, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In an unusual move, the Court delivered two majority opinions; only Justice
Ginsburg joined them both. 68 The first, written by Justice Stevens, found that the
Apprendi-Blakely rule applies to the Guidelines: Booker’s sentence did violate his
Sixth Amendment rights.69 Justice Breyer wrote the second opinion, which found
that the best remedy for the Guidelines’ constitutional problem was to sever and excise the statutory provision that made them binding on federal courts.70 Booker made
the Guidelines merely “advisory,”71 so courts had to “take account of” the offender’s
correct Guidelines range, but they were not bound to follow it. 72 The Court also
struck down a statute that directed courts of appeals to review departures from the
Guidelines de novo.73 After Booker, sentences are reviewed only for their
“reasonableness.”74
Thus, since Booker, a sentencing judge has broad sentencing power—as long as
she lays out a reasonable basis for imposing a particular sentence, she is bound only
by the statutory sentencing limits for the offense of conviction. 75 Not only may she
depart from the Guidelines as she could when they were mandatory, but she may also
“vary” from them by declaring that the calculated range does not serve the purposes
of punishment.76 The law concerning departures and variances is fairly complex and
beyond the scope of this paper, but two points are especially relevant.
First, a court of appeals can vacate a sentence if it finds that the district court
miscalculated the Guidelines range, which is considered “significant procedural error.”77 A sentence is usually considered procedurally unreasonable if the Guidelines

64. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
65. Id. at 227.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 226 (Stevens, J., majority opinion); id. at 244 (Breyer, J., majority opinion).
69. Id. at 243–44 (Stevens, J., majority opinion).
70. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., majority opinion).
71. Id. at 266.
72. Id. at 259.
73. Id. at 260–61.
74. Id. at 261.
75. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 107 (2007) (noting that Booker brought
“advisory Guidelines combined with appellate review for reasonableness”).
76. “‘Departure’ . . . refers only to non-Guidelines sentences imposed under the framework set out in the Guidelines.” Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714 (2008). All other
non-Guidelines sentences are called “variances.” Id. at 715.
77. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
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were miscalculated, even if the sentence actually imposed fell within the proper
Guidelines range.78 This is due to a concern about the “anchoring effect,” a cognitive
bias that causes people to be unduly influenced by the first number they encounter; 79
in the case of sentencing, this “anchor” is the Guidelines range.80 Part II will demonstrate that the power of the courts of appeals to decide what a guideline means and
to vacate sentences that do not comply with that meaning is not trivial.
Second, since Booker, the Supreme Court has held that a district judge’s variance
based solely on her disagreement with the policy judgments of the Sentencing Guidelines is not necessarily unreasonable.81 In Kimbrough v. United States, the district
judge disagreed with the Guidelines’ 100-to-1 ratio between sentences for possessing
crack and powder cocaine (the “crack/powder disparity”). 82 The Court upheld the
district judge’s decision, stating that Booker had made the whole Guidelines Manual
advisory.83 A district court must use the Guidelines as “the starting point and the
initial benchmark” of its sentence,84 but it need not ultimately follow them.85
These developments indicate that there is a tense balance between two seats of
sentencing discretion: the Sentencing Commission, whose Guidelines still carry procedural weight despite being advisory and whom Congress continues to direct to research and promulgate sentencing policy, and the federal district courts, who can
freely vary from the Guidelines’ instructions when sentencing. No other entities have
the explicit authority to directly influence sentencing policy in the federal system.
II. INTERPRETIVE DISCRETION
Though the Sentencing Commission and trial judges exercise the only expressly
delegated sentencing authority in the federal system, the federal courts of appeals
can also influence sentences within their own circuits by interpreting specific provisions in the Guidelines. This appellate power serves a vital and legitimate purpose,
even under the advisory Guidelines: a circuit court’s interpretation of a guideline will
ensure that all the district courts in the circuit apply that guideline consistently.86

78. See United States v. Robinson, 714 F.3d 466, 467–68 (7th Cir. 2013) (“If . . . the twolevel increase for distribution was error, [defendant] is entitled to be resentenced, because the
increase in the guideline range may have influenced the sentence that the judge gave him.”).
79. Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Spot”
Biases in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 495 (2014); see also Jelani Jefferson Exum, The More Things
Change: A Psychological Case Against Allowing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines To Stay
the Same in Light of Gall, Kimbrough, and New Understandings of Reasonableness Review,
58 CATH. U. L. REV. 115, 125–26 (2008).
80. Exum, supra note 79, at 125.
81. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108–10 (2007).
82. See id. at 91.
83. Id.
84. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (decided the same day as Kimbrough).
85. Kimbrough, 552 U.S at 91.
86. See United States v. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 969, 979 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(Pregerson, J., dissenting) (“[I]ntracircuit sentencing disparities . . . defeat the fundamental
purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines: ‘reasonable uniformity in sentencing’ among federal
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When a guideline’s text is especially unclear, the need for consistency within a circuit
is apparent.87 Even if the circuits interpret ambiguous text differently, the
Commission can resolve the ambiguity without worrying about a free-for-all among
the federal district courts.
The Commission is in an unusually strong position to resolve such circuit conflicts.88 While the U.S. Supreme Court is traditionally responsible for resolving circuit splits over the meaning of a statute,89 it has recognized the Sentencing Commission’s unique authority and responsibility to “review and revise” the Guidelines. 90 In
Braxton v. United States, the Court chose not to resolve a circuit conflict because
Congress had entrusted the Commission with the duty to “make whatever clarifying
revisions to the Guidelines conflicting judicial decisions might suggest.” 91 Justice
Scalia, writing for a unanimous bench, suggested that the Court should be “restrained
and circumspect in using [its] certiorari power” to resolve circuit conflicts dealing
with Guidelines issues.92
The Court has kept its promise. Though it has granted certiorari in several cases
involving the Guidelines,93 it has never answered an unsettled question about Guidelines interpretation.94 Thus, the Commission is entirely responsible for fixing problems with how courts interpret the Guidelines; this is due in part to the Commission’s

districts.” (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3,
policy statement (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015))).
87. One guideline that has defied consistent interpretation is section 4B1.2, which defines
the term “crime of violence” as it is used in the Guidelines’ career offender provision. Jones,
supra note 10, at 65–66. According to the section, crimes of violence include offenses that
“involve[] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). The circuits are split, for example, on whether driving while intoxicated (DWI) is a crime of violence.
Compare United States v. Templeton, 543 F.3d 378 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that DWI is not a
crime of violence), with United States v. Spudich, 510 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that
DWI is a crime of violence). The Supreme Court recently struck down an identical residual
clause in the Armed Career Criminals Act as unconstitutionally vague, Johnson v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidating 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012)), and the
Sentencing Commission is in the process of amending section 4B1.2 to delete the clause entirely, Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 80 Fed. Reg. 49,314 (proposed Aug.
17, 2015).
88. Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348 (1991).
89. Id. at 347–48 (“A principal purpose for which we use our certiorari jurisdiction . . . is
to resolve conflicts among the United States courts of appeals and state courts concerning the
meaning of provisions of federal law.”).
90. Id. at 348 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2012)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. These cases often involve the Constitution. See, e.g., Peugh v. United States, 133 S.
Ct. 2072 (2013) (Ex Post Facto clause); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Sixth
Amendment jury-trial right); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (separation of
powers).
94. The Court has on one occasion granted certiorari in a Guidelines case and ruled that
a circuit court’s application of a guideline was incorrect. Salinas v. United States, 547 U.S.
188 (2006) (per curiam), vacating 142 F. App’x 830 (5th Cir. 2005). But the Salinas opinion,
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“unusual explicit power to decide whether and to what extent its amendments reducing sentences will be given retroactive effect.”95
As a result of the Supreme Court’s reticence and the Commission’s deliberate
procedures, the courts of appeals wield substantial power over how the Guidelines
are applied in their circuits. Even when the text of a guideline is not ambiguous,
appellate courts can use their interpretive power to influence sentencing policy. 96
When courts interpret the Guidelines, they often state axiomatically that they apply
the rules of statutory interpretation,97 so this power can be quite broad depending on
a judge’s preferred theory of interpretation. Part II.A will discuss major themes in
modern statutory interpretation; Part II.B will examine three instances where courts
of appeals seem to have exercised undue discretion in interpreting the Guidelines;
and Part II.C will explain why the outcomes of those cases are undesirable in the
current sentencing scheme.
A. Traditional Rules of Statutory Interpretation
A divide has long existed between judges who believe a statutory text has an objective meaning that must control its interpretation, broadly called “textualists,” and
those who believe that either the legislature’s intent or the statute’s purpose can control, broadly called “purposivists.” 98 This schism has led to debates among scholars
and judges about how judges ought to interpret statutes. 99
Modern textualists believe that the only legitimate source of the meaning of a
statute is its text.100 This is true even when the text might appear to defeat the supposed purpose of the statute.101 A major reason textualists choose to reject other evidence of statutory purpose is that the legislative process is easily subverted by party

only two paragraphs long, notes that even the “Solicitor General acknowledge[d] that the Fifth
Circuit incorrectly ruled for the United States.” Id. at 188.
95. Braxton, 500 U.S. at 348 (emphasis omitted) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(u) (2012)).
96. See United States v. Hunn, 24 F.3d 994, 1000 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (arguing strenuously that the majority’s interpretation of the guideline at issue contradicted the provision’s text).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Hackman, 630 F.3d 1078, 1083 (8th Cir. 2011) (“We employ basic rules of statutory construction when interpreting the Guidelines . . . .”); United
States v. Cross, 371 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Interpreting a guideline is no different
than interpreting a statute; the standard rules of statutory construction apply.”); United States
v. Robinson, 94 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1996) (“This Court applies the rules of statutory
construction when interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines.”); United States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d
219, 243 (5th Cir. 1990) (“The Sentencing Guidelines are subject to the rules of statutory
construction.”).
98. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 324 (1990). Eskridge and Frickey distinguish “purposivism”
from “intentionalism,” but the distinction is subtle and unnecessary in this discussion. Id.
99. Id. at 321.
100. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
70, 73 (2006).
101. Id.; see also King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2502 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Statutory design and purpose matter only to the extent they help clarify an otherwise ambiguous provision.”).
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leadership and special-interest groups.102 Furthermore, Professor (now Judge)
Easterbrook points out that nearly every statute is the result of bargaining and compromise among legislators;103 if a statutory outcome seems strange, it is likely a result
of such a bargain.
Justice Scalia used this approach in his dissent in King v. Burwell.104 That case
involved the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s tax subsidies for certain
citizens.105 The statute provided a credit to certain taxpayers, provided they purchased health insurance from “an Exchange established by the State.”106 The Court
held that in order for the statutory scheme to work, this phrase must also include
Exchanges established by the federal government. 107 Scalia was incredulous—how
could “established by the State” mean “established by the State or the federal
government”?108
Justice Scalia argued that the plain language must trump any judicial divination
of purpose.109 He further questioned the majority’s conviction that the textualist reading of the statute did not advance a reasonable motive. 110 In other words, just because
the law did not operate the way the majority thought it should does not justify departing from the plain meaning of the text. 111
The main theory opposing textualism, known as purposivism, was long characterized by a single Supreme Court decision, Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States,112 and its famous rule that “a thing may be within the letter of the statute and
yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit.”113 This was the dominant
approach to statutory interpretation for nearly a century after Holy Trinity was
decided.114
Purposivism is the interpretive theory adopted by The Legal Process, one of the
most influential legal texts of the twentieth century. 115 Writing in 1958, Hart and
Sacks lay out a two-step method for interpreting statutes: a court should first
“[d]ecide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute” and then “[i]nterpret the

102. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540–41, 547–48 (1983).
103. Id. at 540.
104. 135 S. Ct. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 2485 (majority opinion).
106. Id. at 2487 (emphasis in original) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)–(c) (2012)).
107. Id. at 2496.
108. Id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 2502.
110. Id. at 2504.
111. Professor Gluck notes that the petitioners also argued that the textualist reading was
consistent with the purpose of the statute—a good example of a strange-looking bargain.
Gluck, supra note 8, at 72–73.
112. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
113. Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
114. John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 113. For the perspective of a Justice from a past generation, see Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the
Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 538–39 (1947).
115. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS at li, li (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (tent. ed. 1958).
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words of the statute . . . so as to carry out the purpose as best it can.”116 In other
words, a judge should decide on the purpose of the statute first and make the text fit
that meaning second, as long as she does not give the words “a meaning they will not
bear.”117 To find this purpose, the court should not, as Hart and Sacks put it, “tak[e]
account of all the short-run currents of political expedience that swirl around any
legislative session”;118 instead, “[i]t should assume, unless the contrary unmistakably
appears, that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable
purposes reasonably.”119
Hints of this purpose-first approach can be found in Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion in King.120 The structure of the opinion is unusual: rather than discussing
the text at the beginning, determining that it was ambiguous, and then proceeding to
the purpose, which is the usual logical order of interpretation, Roberts began with a
lengthy exposition of the Affordable Care Act’s healthcare scheme. 121 He would use
this “plan” to justify his interpretation of the phrase “established by the state” later
in the opinion.122 Thus the Court seemed to perform a version of the Legal Process
two-step, starting with the statute’s purpose before making the text fit.
A more modern rationale for advancing the legislative purpose is that it would be
a waste of Congress’s time to make it go back and fix its legislation’s text when
purpose is clear from other sources, such as legislative history. 123 This argument is
based on the reality of congressional gridlock: Congress rarely acts to fix statutes
after adverse rulings.124 This principle of “legislative inertia” has even led Professor
(now Judge) Guido Calabresi to propose that courts should be able to invalidate statutes when they have become outmoded just as courts can change common-law
rules.125
Since the resurgence of textualism on the Court starting in the 1990s, however,
Holy Trinity purposivism has fallen into disfavor.126 Professor Gluck argues that
King demonstrates a potential successor to purposivism for today’s modern, complex
Congress.127 She posits that Congress does not draft statutes perfectly—how could
it?—but that its legislation does have a “plan.” 128 This approach is based on
Congress’s institutional inability to meticulously draft the kinds of very long and

116. HART & SACKS, supra note 115, at 1374 (emphasis added).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1378.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
121. Id. at 2485–87.
122. Id. at 2493.
123. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[W]e do the country a disservice when we needlessly ignore persuasive evidence of
Congress’ actual purpose and require it ‘to take the time to revisit the matter’ and to restate its
purpose in more precise English whenever its work product suffers from an omission or inadvertent error.” (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1031 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting))).
124. See Gluck, supra note 8, at 107–08.
125. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 113–14 (1982).
126. Manning, supra note 114, at 125, 131.
127. Gluck, supra note 8, at 87.
128. Id.

2017]

ELI MI NA TI NG CI R CUI T - S PLI T D IS PARI TIES

829

complex bills that today’s Congress is passing.129 The Court’s role in this context is
“only to not ‘negate’ the plan.”130
Judge Posner, responding to Professor Gluck, suggests that judges do not interpret
statutes based on legal scholarship.131 Posner instead says that judges are consciously
or unconsciously influenced by “politics and consequences.” 132 As a result, judges
often consider background principles, such as political outcomes, common-law presumptions, and substantive policy values, when they look at statutes.133 These principles derive not from the text but from the background legal landscape (e.g., the
common law) that Congress is presumed to know. 134
Judges often bring background principles from the common law and other sources
to bear when interpreting statutes. These include the substantive political values
Judge Posner describes,135 as well as the so-called “canons of interpretation” that
Karl Llewellyn long ago derided for being contradictory. 136 Canons fall into two
main categories: linguistic and substantive.137 Linguistic canons deal with the statute’s text; these include expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the rule that the inclusion of certain items in a list excludes those not listed. 138 Substantive canons, on the
other hand, deal with a statute’s policy effects.139 For example, some disfavored effects may be brought about only through a “clear statement” by the legislature. 140
Judges have used these three sources of information—the statute’s text, its purpose, and background principles—to interpret statutes for hundreds of years. 141 The
rules of statutory interpretation have seeped into the common law, guiding courts and
forming schools of thought about how interpretation ought to be done.

129. Id. at 87–88.
130. Id. at 88.
131. Richard A. Posner, Response, Comment on Professor Gluck’s “Imperfect Statutes,
Imperfect Courts,” 129 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 11, 11, 13 (2015).
132. Id.
133. See generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 338–428 (5th ed.
2009) (discussing “background considerations”).
134. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating that, “by a benign fiction, [the Court] assume[s] Congress always has in mind” the
statute’s common-law background).
135. Posner, supra note 131, at 11–12.
136. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950); see
also Michael Sinclair, “Only a Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’s “Dueling Canons,” One
to Seven, 50 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 919, 921 (2005–2006).
137. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 921, 927 (1992).
138. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 805 & n.25 (1983).
139. Shapiro, supra note 137, at 934.
140. Id. at 940 (“Adopted by courts in pursuit of some explicitly stated policy objective,
clear statement rules embody the view that the legislature can achieve a particular result only
by explicit statement . . . .” (emphasis in original)).
141. See POPKIN, supra note 133, at 9–10.
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B. Disparities Against the Text: Three Examples
When they interpret the Guidelines, courts do not always declare the text ambiguous before announcing an interpretation that seems to contradict that text. This
Section will describe three examples of circuit conflicts in which some courts of appeals applied background principles while others stuck to the text.
1. “Express Threat of Death”
Section 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) of the 1993 Guidelines Manual provided that an offender
convicted of bank robbery received a two-level enhancement “if an express threat of
death was made.” The commentary to that section contained an extensive definition
of the phrase:
An “express threat of death[]” . . . may be in the form of an oral or written statement, act, gesture, or combination thereof. For example, an oral
or written demand using words such as “Give me the money or I will kill
you”, “Give me the money or I will pull the pin on the grenade I have in
my pocket”, “Give me the money or I will shoot you”, “Give me your
money or else (where the defendant draws his hand across his throat in a
slashing motion)”, or “Give me the money or you are dead” would constitute an express threat of death. The court should consider that the intent
of the underlying provision is to provide an increased offense level for
cases in which the offender(s) engaged in conduct that would instill in a
reasonable person, who is a victim of the offense, significantly greater
fear than that necessary to constitute an element of the offense of
robbery.142
This language caused a heated circuit split.143 The majority of circuits followed
the Commission’s broad rule as stated in the commentary. 144 The Eleventh Circuit,
by contrast, looked only at the text of the guideline, not the commentary, and held
that “[t]he statement, ‘I have a gun’ . . . . may imply a threat to use the gun, but that
does not constitute an express death threat.” 145
The Seventh Circuit’s case on this issue is representative.146 In United States v.
Hunn, the defendant, Andrew Hunn, committed five bank robberies, and he repeatedly kept his hand inside his coat, leading the banks’ tellers to believe he had a gun.147

142. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1 cmt. n.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
1993) (amended 1997).
143. United States v. Alexander, 88 F.3d 427, 428–29 (6th Cir. 1996) (describing the circuit conflict).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 1161 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v.
France, 57 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hunn, 24 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Lambert, 995 F.2d 1006 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Smith, 973 F.2d
1374 (8th Cir. 1992).
145. United States v. Canzater, 994 F.2d 773, 775 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
146. Hunn, 24 F.3d 994.
147. Id. at 995.
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In particular, Hunn robbed the final bank by
hand[ing] a different teller a note stating, “Give me all the money now. I
have a gun. No tricks, I’m watching.” When this teller replied that Hunn
must be joking, he insisted, “No, I mean it,” and “Hurry up.” The teller
stated that Hunn was pointing something from inside his right coat
pocket toward her during the robbery as if he had a hidden gun. 148
The district court concluded that this behavior constituted an express death threat and
assessed the two-level enhancement.149
The Seventh Circuit affirmed.150 It rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s approach and
called it an “unnecessarily cramped” reading of the guideline. 151 The court also inaccurately characterized the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation as requiring speech as
opposed to “sign-language or miming.”152 The court then analogized the commentary’s definition to the crime of aggravated assault, which requires “communication
of a threat that creates a reasonable apprehension of death or serious bodily harm.” 153
Hunn’s conduct was similar to a 1963 Illinois case in which the defendant committed
assault with intent to murder by showing the outline of a gun through her coat
pocket;154 this similarity was enough for the Seventh Circuit to conclude that Hunn
had made an “express threat of death.” 155
Judge Easterbrook, a staunch textualist, 156 dissented.157 He reasoned that the
Sentencing Commission distinguished between two different types of death threats
—express and implied—and opted to create an enhancement only for express threats.
“A literal reading of the guideline . . . is not ‘cramped’ but is the only way to ensure
that the text serves its function.”158 He claimed that that, through its interpretation,
the majority had read “express” out of the Guideline. 159
With United States v. Alexander, the Sixth Circuit became the first to agree with

148. Id.
149. Id. at 996.
150. Id. at 995.
151. Id. at 997.
152. Id. The Eleventh Circuit merely held that indicating that one has a gun “may imply a
threat to use the gun, but that does not constitute an express death threat.” United States v.
Canzater, 994 F.2d 773, 775 (11th Cir. 1993). One can certainly express a death threat in
pantomime, but, as Judge Easterbrook argues in his dissent in Hunn, it is logically incoherent
to make an express threat by implication. Hunn, 24 F.3d at 1000 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
153. Hunn, 24 F.3d at 997 (majority opinion).
154. People v. Preis, 189 N.E.2d 254 (Ill. 1963). The Supreme Court of Illinois held that
“[a]n assault may consist of using a gesture toward another so as to give him reasonable
grounds to believe that the person using the gesture means to apply actual force to his person.”
Id. at 256.
155. Hunn, 24 F.3d at 997.
156. For Judge Easterbrook’s own views on statutory interpretation, see Easterbrook,
supra note 102.
157. Hunn, 24 F.3d. at 999 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1000.
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the Eleventh Circuit’s and Judge Easterbrook’s reasoning.160 In that case, the district
judge ruled that “saying that I’ve got a bomb in my case and a gun certainly implies
a threat of death to this Court.”161 The Sixth Circuit reversed162 but went further than
either of the earlier opinions. The court ruled that the commentary was actually inconsistent with the text of the guideline and thus was not binding.163 In his opinion
for the court, Judge Suhrheinrich characterized decisions such as the Seventh
Circuit’s as dealing with “direct implication[s] of death,” but not express death
threats.164 In order to satisfy section 2B3.1(b)(2)(F), the court held, “a defendant’s
statement must distinctly and directly indicate that the defendant intends to kill or
otherwise cause the death of the victim.” 165 Otherwise, the word “express” loses all
meaning, and the enhancement applies even when an offender makes an implied
threat.166 As four of the five examples given in the commentary do not “distinctly
and directly” state a death threat, the court found that they are not authoritative
—instead, the guideline’s text controls.167
In 1997, facing this disagreement among the circuits, the Sentencing Commission
amended section 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) and its commentary. 168 Amendment 552 deleted the
word “express” from the guideline and amended the commentary to provide that “the
defendant does not have to state expressly his intent to kill the victim in order for the
enhancement to apply.”169
2. “Distribution” of Child Pornography
The circuits have more recently disagreed over an enhancement in the guideline
concerning possession of child pornography. This enhancement, section
2G2.2(b)(3)(F), increases the offense level by two “[i]f the offense involved . . .
[d]istribution other than distribution described in” other enhancements in the
guideline.170 The commentary defines distribution as
any act, including possession with intent to distribute, production,

160. 88 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 1996). The court quotes extensively from Judge Easterbrook’s
dissent in Hunn. Id. at 430–31.
161. Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 431. “[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a
guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” Stinson v. United States,
508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).
164. Alexander, 88 F.3d at 428–29.
165. Id. at 431 (citing United States v. Cadotte, 57 F.3d 661, 662 (1995) (Arnold, J.,
dissenting)).
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993)).
168. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 552 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2015).
169. Id.
170. Other distribution enhancements include “[d]istribution for pecuniary gain” and
“[d]istribution to a minor.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(3)(A), (C)
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
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transmission, advertisement, and transportation, related to the transfer of
material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. Accordingly,
distribution includes posting material involving the sexual exploitation
of a minor on a website for public viewing but does not include the mere
solicitation of such material by a defendant. 171
The distribution enhancement became effective in November 2000,172 and the
definition of “distribution” in substantially its current form was added in 2004.173
Since then, the technology used in child pornography offenses has changed; today’s
offenders often use so-called peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing programs.174 Some of
these programs automatically upload the files that the user downloads, so that a user
with limited technological understanding might unknowingly “distribute” files. 175
Some courts were hesitant to apply the guideline to offenders who did not know they
were distributing because “strict liability is disfavored in the criminal context.” 176
The circuits have interpreted the enhancement in three different ways: (1) the enhancement applies to any offender who distributes, knowingly or not,177 (2) the
enhancement applies unless the defendant can show “concrete evidence of ignorance,”178 or (3) the enhancement applies only if the prosecution can prove
knowledge.179
The Fifth,180 Tenth,181 and Eleventh182 Circuits have each held that the text of the
guideline and its commentary unambiguously do not contain a knowledge requirement. These cases rely on two key facts about the text. First, the guideline’s language
does not expressly mention any mens rea requirement. 183 The Eleventh Circuit, for

171. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
172. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE HISTORY OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES
35 (2009).
173. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 664 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2015). In 2009, the Commission added a single word (transmission) to the language
of the definition. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 733 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
174. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES
48–53 (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and
-reports/sex-offense-topics/201212-federal-child-pornography-offenses/Full_Report_to_Congress
.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AYX-XBLN] (describing the “P2P” software that child-pornography
offenders use).
175. See United States v. Robinson, 714 F.3d 466, 470 (7th Cir. 2013).
176. Id. at 468; see Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605–06 (1994) (identifying a
common-law rule that “some indication of congressional intent . . . is required to dispense with
mens rea as an element of a crime”).
177. E.g., United States v. Ray, 704 F.3d 1307, 1311–12 (10th Cir. 2013).
178. United States v. Dodd, 598 F.3d 449, 452 (8th Cir. 2010) (emphasis omitted). This
unique approach, applied strictly only in the Eighth Circuit, is beyond the scope of this paper.
179. E.g., Robinson, 714 F.3d at 470.
180. United States v. Baker, 742 F.3d 618, 621–22 (5th Cir. 2014).
181. Ray, 704 F.3d at 1311–12.
182. United States v. Creel, 783 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2015).
183. Baker, 742 F.3d at 621; cf. United States v. Ramos, 695 F.3d 1035, 1041 (10th Cir.
2012) (holding that the distribution enhancements do not require intent to distribute and basing
that holding on the commentary’s plain text).
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instance, concluded that “[i]f the Sentencing Commission ‘meant’ to require
knowledge, it would have ‘said’ as much.”184 Second, the commentary defines
“[d]istribution to a minor” as “the knowing distribution to an individual who is a minor
at the time of the offense.”185 The courts viewed this definition as evidence that the
Commission knew how to draft a knowledge requirement “when they wanted to.”186
In United States v. Robinson, the Seventh Circuit strenuously disagreed with those
textualist conclusions.187 Judge Posner’s opinion for the court does not provide any
textual arguments for the court’s conclusion. 188 Instead, the court summarily rejected
the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning because of the common-law rule against strict liability
in criminal statutes.189 The court also rejected the argument about the commentary’s
“distribution to a minor” definition:
Presumably the required knowledge is that the recipient is a minor, since
in the absence of “knowing” it might well be assumed that liability is
strict—that it’s no defense that the minor looked like an adult—which
was the traditional rule in statutory rape. To assume that by adding
“knowing” to this definition the Sentencing Commission signaled that
it’s not required elsewhere is a stretch.190
Finally, Judge Posner stated that the court was “dealing with a 61-year-old man in
very poor health . . . who on release will be at low risk of recidivating.” 191
Because of Congress’s particular interest in the child-pornography guidelines,192
the Commission has been slow to resolve this split. The Commission has issued a
report to Congress regarding these guidelines, noting the circuit conflict, 193 but they
have not yet proposed an amendment to fix the disparity.
3. (Proximate) Cause of Death
Section 2L1.1 of the Guidelines, which deals with smuggling of unlawful aliens,
includes enhancements that apply “[i]f any person died or sustained bodily injury”

184. Creel, 783 F.3d at 1360 (quoting U.S. v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 2014)).
185. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2015) (emphasis added).
186. Ray, 704 F.3d at 1313.
187. 714 F.3d 466, 468–69 (7th Cir. 2013).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 468 (“But strict liability is disfavored in the criminal context.”).
190. Id. at 468–69 (emphasis added).
191. Id. at 468. Robinson was reported to be sixty-two in April 2012, according to a newspaper report about his original sentence. Retiree Sentenced to Prison in Child Pornography
Case, EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.courierpress.com/news/crime
/326659661.html [https://perma.cc/NN3K-KHZ4]. The article also reports that he used “filesharing programs to download, view and share child pornography.” Id.
192. The PROTECT Act of 2003 directly amended section 2G2.2. Prosecutorial Remedies
and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub.
L. 108-21, § 401(i), 117 Stat. 650, 672–73.
193. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 174, at 33 nn.83–84.
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in the course of the offense.194 The circuits are divided over how directly the defendant must have caused the death or injury.195 The Eighth196 and Ninth197 Circuits have
held that the offender’s conduct must proximately cause 198 the death; the Fifth,199
Tenth,200 and Eleventh201 Circuits have held that the conduct need only be a but-for
cause202 of the death, which is an underlying requirement for all enhancements in the
Sentencing Guidelines.203 Because the enhancement’s text contains no mention of
causation at all, there can be no textualist justification for reading a heightened causation requirement into this enhancement. 204
The facts of United States v. Flores-Flores205 present a good example of when
proximate cause is important. Defendant Flores-Flores was smuggling eleven unlawful aliens across the country in a van with only four seats. 206 During the journey,
Flores was tired, so he asked one of the passengers, Anastacio Ramirez-Ortiz, to take
the wheel.207 Ramirez-Ortiz fell asleep while driving, and the van crashed; two aliens
were killed in the accident.208 The district court applied the enhancement, which was

194. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.1(b)(7) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2015).
195. United States v. Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d 398, 401 & nn.2–3 (5th Cir. 2014) (describing the circuit split).
196. United States v. Flores-Flores, 356 F.3d 861, 862 (8th Cir. 2004).
197. United States v. Herrera-Rojas, 243 F.3d 1139, 1144 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001).
198. A defendant’s action is the proximate cause of a harm if there was no other, more
direct cause of that harm. See Michael S. Moore, The Metaphysics of Causal Intervention, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 827, 828 (2000).
199. Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d at 401.
200. United States v. Cardena-Garcia, 362 F.3d 663, 666 (10th Cir. 2004).
201. United States v. Zaldivar, 615 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 2010).
202. Justice Scalia recently illustrated “but-for” causation with baseball:
Consider a baseball game in which the visiting team’s leadoff batter hits a home
run in the top of the first inning. If the visiting team goes on to win by a score of
1 to 0, every person competent in the English language and familiar with the
American pastime would agree that the victory resulted from the home run. This
is so because it is natural to say that one event is the outcome or consequence of
another when the former would not have occurred but for the latter.
Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 888 (2014).
203. As a general rule, a sentencing judge should consider “all harm that resulted from”
the offender’s conduct when applying the Guidelines. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 1B1.3(a)(3) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015) (emphasis added). The U.S. Supreme Court
has held that the phrase “resulted from” means only but-for causation. Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at
887–88.
204. Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d at 401.
205. 356 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 2004).
206. Id. at 862.
207. Brief for Appellant at 10, Flores-Flores, 356 F.3d 861 (No. 03-3103), 2003 WL
23005404 at *10.
208. Flores-Flores, 356 F.3d at 862.
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eight levels at the time.209 Flores objected, arguing that he did nothing to proximately
cause the aliens’ deaths.210
The Eighth Circuit ultimately decided that Flores did proximately cause the deaths
because he was transporting far more people in the van than it could hold.211 The
court noted, however, that “[t]he negligence of Ramirez-Ortiz was not an intervening
cause relieving Flores of responsibility.” 212 This dictum suggests that, in the Eighth
Circuit, an intervening cause could render the enhancement inapplicable to a defendant because the enhancement requires proximate cause. 213 The Ninth Circuit described a similar requirement in a footnote: “We assume . . . that for [subsection
(b)(7)] to apply, the relevant death or injury must be causally connected to dangerous
conditions created by the unlawful conduct . . . .”214
As other circuits have noted, the guideline’s language does not expressly require
any specific type of causation.215 The common law contains a presumption that proximate cause is an element of any crime that requires a certain result. 216 This rule is
certainly well established for criminal statutes, and the Ninth Circuit has applied it
to the statutory offense of transporting unlawful aliens resulting in death. 217 But
courts that use the rule are departing from the four corners of the text of the statute
(or guideline) and applying a common-law rule.218
The Fifth Circuit recognized the circuit split and agreed with the textualist courts
that “[t]he guideline contains no causation requirement and [the court has] no license
to impose one.”219 In United States v. Ramos-Delgado, the court looked instead to
section 1B1.3, which describes in general the conduct a judge may consider when
applying the Guidelines.220 Subsection (a)(3) directs a judge to consider “all harm
that resulted from the acts and omissions” of the offender made during the offense
conduct.221 The court held that the phrase “resulted from” means but-for, not proximate, causation.222

209. Id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.1(b)(6)(4) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2002) (providing the eight-level enhancement in effect in February 2003 when the
accident occurred). Besides the magnitude of the enhancement, the provision has not substantively changed since 2002. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.1(b)(7)(D) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
210. Flores-Flores, 356 F.3d at 862.
211. Id. at 862–63.
212. Id. at 863.
213. See Moore, supra note 198, at 831.
214. United States v. Herrera-Rojas, 243 F.3d 1139, 1144 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis
added).
215. E.g., United States v. Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 2014).
216. United States v. Pineda-Doval, 614 F.3d 1019, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 2010).
217. Id. at 1027–28.
218. See supra Part II.A.
219. Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d at 401 (quoting United States v. Cardena-Garcia, 362 F.3d
663, 666 (10th Cir. 2004)).
220. Id.
221. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(3) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
222. Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d at 401. The phrase “caused by” might impose a proximate
cause requirement. See Cardena-Garcia, 362 F.3d at 666 (“Resulting in death and causing
death are not equivalents.”).

2017]

ELI MI NA TI NG CI R CUI T - S PLI T D IS PARI TIES

837

No court, applying either method, has actually ruled that a defendant’s relevant
conduct was the but-for cause, but not the proximate cause, of his victims’ deaths.223
This might happen if, for example, the “defendants’ actions . . . merely sprained a
passenger’s hand, making him go to the hospital, and the hospital exploded from a
gas leak.”224 According to the courts that use a textualist reading, subsection (b)(7)
would apply to that defendant.225
The Sentencing Commission has not made revising this guideline a priority in any
of the three amendment cycles since Ramos-Delgado was decided.226 This is probably because a scenario that would implicate the split, like the example given above,
seems so unlikely to occur.
C. The Problem with Appellate Sentencing Discretion
As the foregoing examples illustrate, the courts of appeals do not always follow
the text of the Guidelines, even when the text is unambiguous. While this is consistent with the way some courts interpret statutes, 227 the differences between the
Commission and Congress make this sort of interpretation harder to justify.228
Congress has empowered the Sentencing Commission to write the Guidelines and
determine federal sentencing policy. 229 District courts may disagree with and disregard this policy, but they must do so transparently by stating a reason for variance.230 Courts of appeals, however, have no such direct authority. Differences
among the circuits lead to disparities simply because a guideline might apply to certain conduct in one jurisdiction and not the other.
Take as an example an offender who unknowingly distributes child pornography
through a P2P file-sharing program. If he were convicted in Kansas, located in the
Tenth Circuit, the court would apply the two-level enhancement in section
2G2.2(b)(3)(F).231 On the other hand, if he were convicted in Illinois, part of the
Seventh Circuit, he would not receive the enhancement, leading to a significantly
shorter sentence.232 This geographic or jurisdictional disparity is clearly unwarranted.
If this power of the appellate courts is left unchecked, the Commission’s ability
to use the words of the Guidelines233 to set federal sentencing policy will be subject

223. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Flores, 356 F.3d 861, 863 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding
that defendant’s actions did proximately cause deaths).
224. Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d at 402.
225. Id.
226. See Final Priorities for Amendment Cycle, 81 Fed. Reg. 58,004 (Aug. 24, 2016); Final
Priorities for Amendment Cycle, 80 Fed. Reg. 48,957 (Aug. 14, 2015); Final Priorities for
Amendment Cycle, 79 Fed. Reg. 49,378 (Aug. 20, 2014).
227. See supra Part II.A.
228. See infra Part III.
229. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2012).
230. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108–09 (2007).
231. See United States v. Ray, 704 F.3d 1307, 1313 (10th Cir. 2013).
232. See United States v. Robinson, 714 F.3d 466, 468–69 (7th Cir. 2013).
233. Cf. Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1613 (2012) (“Whether or not Congress is always meticulous, if we don’t assume that Congress picks its words with care, then Congress
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to the common-law power of the courts of appeals. It is therefore important to discuss
the proper use of the appellate power to interpret the Guidelines and to consider how
to minimize these types of disparities.
III. THE GUIDELINES ARE NOT STATUTES
Judges often invoke Congress’s complex lawmaking procedure as a reason to depart from the plain meaning of the text of a statute.234 Indeed, Congress is a complicated body, and interpreting its words can be a challenging endeavor. But the
Sentencing Commission is not, as Justice Scalia famously described, merely a
“junior-varsity Congress.”235 The Commission’s membership and its procedures
practically ensure that the body means what it says in the Guidelines. 236 This Part
will show the differences between the Commission and Congress and propose that
the Guidelines should not be interpreted with all the freedom of statutory
interpretation.
Congress designed the Sentencing Commission as a politically insulated, independent body of experts who would set sentencing policy without being influenced
by public pressure.237 The Commission currently comprises five voting members and
two ex officio members who do not vote.238 The voting Commissioners include three
federal judges, a law professor, and a former Assistant U.S. Attorney, 239 and nearly
everyone who has ever served on the Commission has been either a judge or a law
professor.240 These individuals are selected for their expertise in sentencing issues
and their practical experience with sentencing. 241 The Commissioners also have to
be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and no more than four

won’t be able to rely on words to specify what policies it wishes to adopt . . . .” (emphasis in
original)).
234. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015) (“Congress passed much of
the Act using a complicated budgetary procedure known as ‘reconciliation,’ with limited opportunities for debate and amendment . . . .”).
235. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring
to the Commission’s lawmaking powers).
236. Justice Thomas lucidly described statutory textualism as the doctrine that “courts must
presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says
there.” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992).
237. Gertner, supra note 15, at 698.
238. About the Commissioners, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov/about
/commissioners/about-commissioners [https://perma.cc/A2LX-NYYZ]; see also Organization, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov/about/who-we-are/organization [https://
perma.cc/E5FW-Z82V] (noting that two of the seven voting positions on the Commission are
vacant as of November 2016).
239. About the Commissioners, supra note 238.
240. Former Commissioner Information, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov
/new/former-commissioner-information [https://perma.cc/978Q-3KT7]. Current Supreme
Court Associate Justice Stephen Breyer was a founding member of the Sentencing
Commission. Id.
241. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2012) mandates that “at least 3 of the members shall
be Federal judges.”
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can be from a single party.242 Finally, Commissioners can be removed “by the
President only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other good cause
shown.”243
Members of Congress, by contrast, are politicians with political motivations. A
recent survey of Congress showed that 331 out of 535 members consider themselves
professional politicians, nearly sixty-two percent.244 As a result, political pressures
affect legislative decisions much more than members’ expertise does. Senator Orrin
Hatch once stated that he had long personally supported reducing sentences for drug
crimes but that he was not able to act on that for political reasons. 245 Furthermore,
while the Commissioners are experts on criminal law and sentencing, Congress’s
expertise is much more varied.246 In the 114th Congress, at most sixty-four members
have judicial or law enforcement experience. 247 This variety can promote a democratic and representational legislature, but it suggests that members of Congress may
not necessarily understand everything they vote for. Thus, legislative mistakes are
inevitable.248
Even if the Commission does make a textual mistake, as it might have done with
the death-threat enhancement discussed earlier,249 it can easily correct the mistake.
Congress has directed the Commission to “periodically . . . review and revise” the
Guidelines250 and to submit proposed amendments to Congress by May 1 each
year.251 As a result, the Commission usually drafts amendments in yearly batches,
publishing a new edition of the Guidelines Manual each November. 252

242. Id.
243. Id.
244. JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43869, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 114TH
CONGRESS: A PROFILE 2 (2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43869.pdf [https://perma
.cc/9WHZ-7SEC]. The profile notes that “[m]ost Members list more than one profession.” Id.
at 3 n.8.
245. Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 43
(2006).
246. See MANNING, supra note 244, at 3–4.
247. This number includes members who describe themselves as judges, prosecutors, sheriffs, or police officers, but it does not account for possible double counting of members who
reported more than one of these occupations. Id.
248. Cf. Gluck, supra note 8, at 101.
249. See supra Part II.B.1.
250. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2012).
251. Id. § 994(p).
252. The Commission has released a new version of the Guidelines nearly every November
since 1989. Guidelines Manual Archives, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov
/guidelines-manual/guidelines-manual-archives [https://perma.cc/38L9-AX4E]. There have
been only two exceptions. In 1999, the chair of the Commission resigned and the other
commissioners’ terms expired, leaving no voting commissioner to vote on amendments until
November, long after the May 1 deadline. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT
7 (1999), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports
-and-sourcebooks/1999/ar99chap2.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6DT-ZRZX]. In 1996, the Commission “declared a moratorium on guideline amendments” to focus on a comprehensive
simplification of the Guidelines. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1999),
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The Sentencing Commission goes through an amendment cycle each year.253 In
August, the Commission publishes its policy “priorities” for the year’s batch of
amendments.254 These priorities are set based on the Commission’s continual research of sentencing practices nationwide. 255 For example, the Commission’s priorities for the 2013 cycle included “[r]eview, and possible amendment, of guidelines
applicable to drug offenses, including possible consideration of amending the Drug
Quantity Table . . . across drug types.”256 The amendment that this review produced
ultimately released six thousand federal inmates in 2015. 257
Next, the Commission solicits the advice of various interested parties in the criminal justice system.258 The U.S. Probation System, the Bureau of Prisons, the Judicial
Conference, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, and the Federal
Public Defenders are all required by statute to comment on the Commission’s proposals.259 By January, the draft amendment language is ready, which the Commission
publishes for public comment.260
Finally, at the end of April, the Commissioners vote to send the proposed amendments to Congress.261 If Congress is silent, the amendments take effect on November
1 of that year.262 To disapprove a proposed amendment, Congress must pass a law
through both houses, and the President must sign it.263 Congress has passed such a
bill only once in the history of the Guidelines.264
Congress’s procedure, memorialized in Schoolhouse Rock,265 is incredibly involved266 and often results in gridlock.267 Even the constitutional requirements for

http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-source
books/1996/Chapter02.pdf [https://perma.cc/PG2N-5HH7].
253. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 25 (2015), http://
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys
/miscellaneous/201510_fed-sentencing-basics.pdf [https://perma.cc/VF6W-9QHK].
254. Id.
255. See id. at 27.
256. Notice of Final Priorities, 78 Fed. Reg. 51,820, 51,821 (Aug. 21, 2013).
257. See supra text accompanying note 3.
258. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 253, at 25; see 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2012)
(“[T]he Commission shall consult with authorities on . . . various aspects of the Federal criminal justice system.”).
259. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o).
260. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 253, at 25.
261. Id.
262. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 253, at 25.
263. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 253, at 25.
264. Id. at 25, 38 n.183. On October 30, 1995, Congress and President Clinton disapproved
two proposed amendments: one that would reduce the controversial 100-to-1 crack to powder
cocaine weight ratio and another regarding sentences for money laundering. Act of Oct. 30,
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334; Statement on Signing Legislation Rejecting U.S.
Sentencing Commission Recommendations, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1700 (Oct. 30, 1995).
265. Schoolhouse Rock: I’m Just a Bill (ABC television broadcast Feb. 5, 1977),
http://abc.go.com/shows/schoolhouse-rock/episode-guide/season-01/24-im-just-a-bill [https://
perma.cc/LTD9-TA9R].
266. See U.S. CONST. art. I.
267. See Gluck, supra note 8, at 107–08.
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passing a bill are stringent: a bill must pass both houses of Congress and be signed
by the President.268 Furthermore, a complex system of committees and subcommittees can prevent a bill from ever reaching a floor vote, 269 and congressional
leadership can exert a surprising amount of influence on voting outcomes through
such seemingly benign powers as the right to set the day’s agenda. 270
The Commission’s fluent procedure means that it can correct its mistakes. When
the circuit split developed over the “express threat” enhancement described above,
the Commission amended that guideline to delete the word “express.” 271 Though that
amendment took four years from the time the disagreement started,272 that is relatively fast considering the amount of research the Commission does. Therefore, the
Commission does not need the courts to fix perceived errors in the text of the
Guidelines, even if Congress does.273
IV. STRICT TEXTUALISM
A strictly textualist interpretation of an unambiguous provision—or of the unambiguous commentary to an unclear provision274—is the best way to interpret the
Guidelines. There are several reasons for this argument. First, strict textualism, unadorned by common-law presumptions or policy-based canons, is the method of interpretation least susceptible to judicial manipulation. Second, strict interpretation
will encourage the Sentencing Commission to be meticulous when drafting the
Guidelines in the first place275 and will signal to the Commission when they have
drafted a guideline incorrectly without creating the potential for unwarranted disparities caused by a circuit split.
Courts must therefore be careful not to read into the Guidelines background principles from the common law or policy considerations. 276 While many of these
considerations make sense for actual statutes, to which they applied at common law,
they should not apply to the Guidelines, which are a novel kind of text that only
emerged in the last thirty years. Furthermore, judicial use of policy considerations
undermines the Sentencing Commission’s role in setting sentencing policy for the
United States.277 To be sure, some of that discretion was transferred to district courts

268. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
269. See POPKIN, supra note 133, at 500–01.
270. Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA.
L. REV. 561, 564–65 (1977).
271. See supra Part II.B.1.
272. United States v. Canzater, the Eleventh Circuit case that used a textualist reading, was
decided in July 1993, 994 F.2d 773 (11th Cir. 1993); the Commission’s amendment became
effective on November 1, 1997, United States v. Arevalo, 242 F.3d 925, 927 (10th Cir. 2001)
(describing amendment).
273. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
274. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993).
275. Cf. Scalia & Manning, supra note 233, at 1616 (“If legislators didn’t look up the materials needed to define a technical term, they should have—because that’s the meaning the
persons subject to the law will understand.”).
276. See supra Part II.A.
277. See 28 U.S.C. 994(a) (2012).
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by the Booker decision, but none besides the ability to vacate an “unreasonable”
sentence was ever assigned to courts of appeals;278 those courts can only affect
sentences by interpreting the Guidelines.
The two sections below suggest two ways279 to solve this unwarranted disparity.
The first would be imposed on courts by the Commission; the second, the courts must
adopt themselves.
A. An Interpretive Guideline
The Sentencing Commission can directly articulate a preferred method of interpretation within the Guidelines Manual itself. There is already plenty of information
in the Guidelines about their application; for example, the commentary to section
1B1.1 contains a list of general definitions that control the entire Manual. 280 The
Commission could insert the following language into that section:
The guidelines shall be interpreted according to their plain language
when it is unambiguous and according to the plain language of the commentary when the corresponding guideline is ambiguous. No guideline
shall be interpreted to have any implied meaning, and substantive canons
of statutory interpretation do not apply to unambiguous guidelines.
This would be a difficult directive to ignore, both for parties and for judges, and
it would discourage judges from applying substantive considerations that they admit
are not clearly part of the text. 281
But courts have long resisted legislative attempts to control statutory interpretation;282 there is no reason to believe that courts will treat similar attempts by the
Sentencing Commission differently. Professor Gluck describes a Connecticut statute
that prohibited judges from considering “extratextual evidence” when the text is unambiguous and notes that the Connecticut Supreme Court has strongly resisted the
effect of the statute.283 Indeed, that court has found ambiguity in a statute simply
because the litigants disputed the statute’s meaning.284

278. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005) (Breyer, J., majority opinion).
279. This Note deals with only those guidelines that have facially unambiguous texts. The
solutions do not apply when a judge must choose between two different meanings of a word.
For an interesting solution for interpreting truly ambiguous guidelines, see James W. Harlow,
Comment, Does the Calculation Matter? The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Doctrine
of Alternate Variance Sentences, 66 S.C. L. REV. 987 (2015), which describes a practice where
the appellate court will refuse to review a challenged guideline interpretation if the district
court’s sentence properly considered statutory factors.
280. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
281. See United States v. Robinson, 714 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 2013) (reversing because
“strict liability is disfavored in the criminal context”); United States v. Herrera-Rojas, 243
F.3d 1139, 1144 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001) (“assum[ing]” that the guideline contains a causation
requirement).
282. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1824–25 (2010).
283. Id. at 1794–95 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-2z (West 2007)).
284. Id. at 1795–96, 1796 n.169 (listing cases); see, e.g., State v. Jenkins, 954 A.2d 806,
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Moreover, the Braxton decision means that the Supreme Court would probably
deny certiorari to any case dealing with the interpretation of the Guidelines. 285 Without a meaningful right to appeal, prosecutors and defendants would have no way to
correct a circuit court’s decision to disregard the interpretive rule. As a result, such a
rule would have no teeth.
B. Changing the Courts
Because any external rule for interpreting the Guidelines would be too-easily resisted by courts, this change must come from within the bench itself. Courts of appeals must recognize that any time two circuits interpret a guideline differently, they
create “unwarranted sentencing disparities,” 286 and they cannot each simply blame
the disparity on the other court’s erroneous interpretation. Instead, circuit court
judges should aspire to use a single method of interpretation—preferably, strict
textualism.
Some judges may shudder at the notion of any stricture in statutory interpretation,
as it is the court’s responsibility to “say what the law is.”287 Or, because many of the
common-law rules that apply to criminal statutes tend to benefit defendants, judges
may face the morally uncomfortable task of affirming a sentence they find too
harsh.288 Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in the Robinson case, was
reluctant to sentence a “61-year-old man in very poor health” to ten years in prison. 289
Appellate courts may also be unwilling to give up what little discretion they have in
the sentencing process.290
Consistent textual interpretation among the circuits would return sentencing discretion and the authority to decide sentencing policy to the parties that should rightfully possess it: the Sentencing Commission and district courts. It would affect the
way prosecutors, who rely on the meaning of the Guidelines, make plea agreements,
and whether defendants choose to appeal their sentences. Finally, and most importantly, it would eliminate the possibility of the unwarranted sentencing disparities
described in Part II.B.
If the Sentencing Commission realizes that the text of a guideline does not adequately convey its purpose, it can easily amend the provision to make it clearer. This
is what the Commission did for the “express threat of death” guideline—here, the

812 (Conn. 2008).
285. See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348 (1991); see also supra notes 93–94.
286. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2012).
287. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
288. This is a position federal district judges find themselves in every day when they must
apply mandatory minimum sentences. See, e.g., United States v. Dossie, 851 F. Supp. 2d 478,
478 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“This case illustrates how mandatory minimum sentences in drug
cases . . . mandate unjust sentences.”).
289. United States v. Robinson, 714 F.3d 466, 467–68 (7th Cir. 2013).
290. Booker and its progeny represent the judiciary’s reclamation of some of its former
sentencing discretion from the Sentencing Commission. See D. Michael Fisher, Still in Balance? Federal District Court Discretion and Appellate Review Six Years After Booker, 49
DUQ. L. REV. 641, 643 (2011).
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solution would be the same, but there would not be a circuit split to create the disparities seen in that example.291
CONCLUSION
As the history of sentencing reform has shown, substantive sentencing decisions
are properly made only by the Sentencing Commission and trial courts. The
Commission derives its authority from the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, with
which Congress significantly reduced judicial discretion at sentencing. When the
Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines advisory in Booker, trial judges reclaimed
much of their former discretion, but the Commission still had a say in sentencing
policy, however weak.
The federal courts of appeals were never empowered to make sentencing policy.
But the federal appellate bench has enough discretion to influence policy simply by
interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines. When different courts interpret a provision
of the Guidelines differently, sentencing disparities can result among the circuits, and
this threatens the principle of uniform sentencing that underlies the modern
sentencing-reform movement. Disparities caused by interpretation are especially unwarranted when they contradict the unambiguous language that the Commission uses
in the Guidelines.
Uniformity of sentencing can be preserved most effectively with uniformity of
interpretation among the federal courts of appeals. While there are many ways to
interpret statutes, courts can eliminate disparities by deciding on a single method
when they consider the Guidelines. Justifications for deviating from the unambiguous text of a statute, such as procedural efficiency or common-law principles,
do not apply to the Guidelines because of the Sentencing Commission’s unique composition and procedure.
Thus, the method most conducive to uniformity, and the only method that can
preserve the Commission’s role in setting the nation’s sentencing policy, is strict
textualism. This approach is easy to justify because it defers substantially to the
Commission’s ability to express its policy decisions in words and to fix its own mistakes, as it has done by recently reducing the Guidelines’ sentences for drug offenses.
If a textualist reading of the Guidelines is adopted throughout the federal circuits, the
Commission can continue to effectively produce advisory sentencing policy for the
trial courts, and courts of appeals can save their interpretive power for the truly difficult sentencing cases.

291. See supra Part II.B.1.

